24-25

The Revival of Treble-Winning Pressing Tactics [24-25 PL27 Tottenham 0-1 Manchester City]

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Introduction

Even though Man City had lost against Liverpool last week, they showed much better performance out of possession. The pressing caused problems for the opposition and that provided Man City more time in possession to gain the control of the game in the way they want. Following that performance, they came to London with more organised pressing to take the ball away from Tottenham. The structure was similar to what they utilised when they won the treble, so it might be possible to say, “the revival of treble-winning pressing tactics”, although it is little bit exaggerated because they lost it after the changes in the midfield, to be fair.

In this article, the match is going to be analysed in detail to find out how Man City regained the control of the game out of possession and how Spurs tried to counter by using the third man combination to find a spare player. Additionally, the benefit of the way of Man City’s pressing compared to the traditional 4-4-2 pressing is also going to be discussed later in this article.

Before we move on, here’s the line up of the game. Tottenham fielded so many young talents and Man City brought Haaland back up front.

WGs pulling the trigger of pressing

To get straight to the point, the way which Man City pressed was that Haaland and Marmoush screened the back of them to cut off the passing lanes to the opposition defensive midfielder, Bentancur, from the centre backs, and the winger, Doku and Savinho stepped up to press the opposition centre backs, which looked like a 4-2-4.

This panicked Gray and Danso especially in the first ten minutes and Spurs lost the possession at the back a few times. In 4th minutes, Gray tried to chip the ball over Savinho who committed to Danso, but as the ball took more time and Marmoush had time to close down Udogie to win it. Also, in 7th minutes, Gray had no options around him as Doku cut the passing lane to Porro and Haaland screened Bentancur, so he drove forwards, but Kovačić had been waiting there.

This type of pressing had often seen when City won the treble and many teams in Europe recently utilise it (of course many teams outside of Europe do that). The advantage of this will be analysed later with the discussion of how Tottenham found the way to break through this pressing structure.

Don’t move, but move the ball to move opponents

As well as pressing, Man City could play really well with the ball. Recent their tactics in possession were often described as flexibility or fluidity, but it was quite opposite in this game. Nunes inverted into the central midfield position next to Kovačić and the front five occupied each lane. It was a really static 3-2-5 structure.

Recently, for example, Foden, Silva or De Bruyne often move across the lanes to get more involved in the game or shake off the defender as more teams try to mark the opponents tightly by going man for man. However, this can go wrong when they cannot make the most of the imbalance against the opponents and it can be the imbalance against themselves.

Against Spurs, who pressed with zonal approach, there was no need to move too much unnecessarily. Just being in between the opposition shape was enough. And the goal came from playing out from the back.

Ederson became a part of the back four and other players spread in the pitch to occupy each area effectively. Then, as Bergvall and Maddison got close to Kovačić and Nunes, the space between the lines opened up. Marmoush dropped to receive the split pass from Ederson, turned forwards and gave the ball to Savinho. This is a great example of dragging the opponents out to expand the gap between the lines and exploiting there.

After that, the ball was travelled from Savinho to Doku on the left through Haaland and González in the middle.

A winger cutting inside and switching the ball to exploit the opposite space where only a few defenders can cover is a classic move after successfully playing through the opposition pressing.

Overall, in possession, Man City organised themselves in more static structure to break down the opposition zonal defensive system. This allowed City to have more controlled possession and is also revival of traditional Pep’s City.

Tottenham’s solution & Difference made by substitutes

Both in and out of possession, Man City started the game really well and scored the first one with some chances to make it more. But after the Haaland’s goal, Spurs found the solution to play through Man City’s pressing as they also allowed Spurs more time to have the ball to keep the compact shape.

In the first ten minutes, Gray couldn’t deal with Doku’s pressure well, but after that, he was the main man to beat the pressing. As Doku coming outside to Gray, Porro, the right fullback could be a spare player. The problem is how to give the ball to him. If Doku applied pressure on Gray at the right moment, it is difficult for him to open his body to create an angle to play to Porro. However, as the game progressed, he became able to anticipate Doku’s pressure and drive forwards to recreate the passing lane to Porro. Another solution was using the third man combination. Bergvall dropped to receive the ball from Gray with González on his back and laid off to Porro. These worked well to move the ball away from City’s pressure.

Spurs could often find a spare player at the back like the example in the illustrations above, but they failed to complete the passes played in behind. Man City organised a compact block rather than unnecessarily following the opponents, so the defenders were ready for dropping back when the ball was played in behind. Moreover, Ederson defended the space in behind well, although he had made some errors when covering the space behind the back line this season.

Although Man City pressed with the 4-2-4 structure at the beginning, after the first half and especially after Foden and Silva came on with replaceing González and Marmoush, the pressing structure changed to the way they had done recently.

As Bentancur started to drop deeper to avoid Haaland and Marmoush and having been dominated the possession by Spurs after scoring the goal in the first half, of course the causes can only be guessed though, González started to push higher. In terms of the change in Spurs, either of Maddison or Bergvall dropped deeper more often to create an overload at the back consistently. Then, Spurs could progress much easier by finding a spare player behind Haaland and Marmoush.

Not sure about the reason of City’s change and the drop of intensity of Doku, Savinho, Marmoush and Haaland could be the reason why Spurs became able to progress, but the truth was the revival didn’t last throughout the game.

Especially after Silva and Foden coming on in the 73rd minutes, they started to press with high intensity and chased the ball even on Vicario. This made City’s structure more man-oriented than zone-oriented, and to be fair, Man City’s pressing hadn’t improved after the half time.

The benefit of the 4-2-4 Pressing

Then, what are the benefits of the 4-2-4 pressing and what are the differences between the normal 4-4-2 which the strikers trigger the pressing and the 4-2-4 which the wingers trigger the pressing?

The biggest difference is whether the centre backs need to leave the back line or not. Look at the picture below. The sky blues in a 4-4-2 press against the oranges in a 4-2-3-1.

As the striker presses on the opposition centre back on the ball, the opposition defensive midfielder would be free, so the defensive midfielder needs to step up. But the opposition 10 in between the lines will be left, so the centre back needs to jump. This will leave a gap between the right centre back and left fullback and there will be three 1v1s.

The example below is that the left winger applies pressure on the opposition centre back on the ball.

As the striker can keep marking the opposition defensive midfielder, the defensive midfielder can mark the opposition 10, so the left centre back doesn’t need to leave the back line.

Of course, there’s a risk of leaving the opposition ball side fullback free, but it is less dangerous than leaving the back line three 1v1s. Additionally, even if the ball side fullback jumps to the opposition fullback, it is much better.

The back of three consists of two centre backs and a fullback, which means there are more stronger defenders at the back compared to the system which either of the centre backs needs to leave to close down the opponent in between the lines.

Needless to say, the quality of players will determine if which one is better,but the difference of structure in general is just mentioned. Thanks for reading.